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We show that abnormal returns to analysts’ recommendations stem from both the ratings levels
assigned and the changes in those ratings. Conditional on the ratings change, buy and strong
buy recommendations have greater returns than do holds, sells, and strong sells. Conditional
on the ratings level, upgrades earn the highest returns and downgrades the lowest. We also
find that both ratings levels and changes predict future unexpected earnings and the associated
market reaction. Our results imply that 1) investment returns may be enhanced by conditioning on
both recommendation levels and changes; 2) the predictive power of analysts’ recommendations
reflects, at least partially, analysts’ ability to generate valuable private information; and 3)
some inconsistency exists between analysts’ ratings and the formal ratings definitions issued by
securities firms.
It has been well established in the academic literature that analysts’ stock recommendations can
predict security returns.1 What has not been established is whether this predictive power stems
from the ratings level assigned by analysts or the change in the ratings level (or both). The goal
of this paper is to provide insights into the sources of recommendations’ predictive value and,
as a consequence, enhance our understanding of how they can best be employed as part of an
investment strategy.
Virtually all of the research papers to date that analyze recommendation returns focus on either
ratings changes or ratings levels, but not both. Since changes and levels are positively correlated,
such analyses cannot generate insights into the source(s) of recommendations’ predictive value.
In contrast, we include both recommendation levels and changes in our analysis. This allows us
to calculate the stock returns associated with changes in analysts’ ratings, conditional on ratings
level, and the returns associated with analyst ratings levels, conditional on ratings change. We
find that both ratings changes and ratings levels have incremental predictive power for security
returns.
In a recent paper, Jegadeesh et al. (2004) examine both ratings changes and levels. They find
that the magnitude of analyst consensus recommendation changes is significantly associated with
future returns. In contrast, no significant relation is found between the consensus recommendation
levels, themselves, and future returns (after controlling for other known drivers of stock returns).
This paper has benefited from the comments of the editor (Bill Christie), an anonymous referee, and seminar participants
at Barclays Global Investors and Rice University.
∗Brad M. Barber is a Professor of Finance at University of California, Davis in Davis, California, USA. Reuven Lehavy
is a Professor of Accounting at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA. Brett Trueman is a Professor
of Accounting at UCLA in Los Angeles, California, USA.
1 See, for example, Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001), Jegadeesh and Kim (2006), and Green (2006).
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The methodology employed by Jegadeesh et al. (2004), however, makes it unlikely that they
are fully capturing the value of analyst recommendations. They form consensus recommendation
level and change portfolios only once a quarter. They then measure portfolio returns over the
subsequent six months, with the composition of each portfolio remaining fixed during that
period. As Barber et al. (2001) show, portfolio returns are diminished by delaying for a few
weeks the rebalancing of portfolios following consensus recommendation changes, as well as by
not rebalancing portfolios daily.2 It is unclear how Jegadeesh et al.’s methodology impacts their
conclusions.
Our analysis avoids these potential issues. Our return accumulation period begins when an
analyst initiates coverage, reiterates his or her recommendation, or changes it, and ends when a
subsequent recommendation is issued or coverage is dropped. This procedure ensures that there
is no delay in the accumulation of recommendation returns.
As a prelude to our main analysis, we compare returns across ratings levels, independent of
whether a particular recommendation represents an upgrade, downgrade, reiteration, or initiation.
We also compare returns across ratings changes, unconditional on whether the recommendation
level is a buy, hold, or sell. Consistent with findings of Barber et al. (2001), average daily abnormal
returns generally decrease as we move from more favorable to less favorable recommendations.
They range from 1.0 and 0.7 basis points for strong buys and buys, respectively, to −2.5 and −2.4
basis points for sells and strong sells, respectively.
Returns also generally increase with the favorableness of a recommendation change. Upgrades
are associated with an average daily abnormal return of 1.9 basis points versus 0.5 for initiations
and reiterations, and −1.0 for downgrades. The magnitude of an upgrade, however, is not signif-
icantly related to average abnormal return. In contrast, average daily abnormal returns decrease
with downgrade magnitude, ranging from −0.7 basis points for downgrades of only one ratings
level to −1.6 and −4.4 basis points for downgrades of two and three ratings levels, respectively.
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) find that the relation between recommendation level and abnormal
return becomes insignificant after controlling for price and earnings momentum. To determine
whether the delays that are introduced into their portfolio formation process might be driving
their result, we replicate the construction of their price and earnings momentum index. We then
partition our sample of recommendations into quintiles according to index value. Within each
momentum quintile, we again find that the average daily abnormal return for buys and strong
buys is reliably greater than that for sells and strong sells (with the difference ranging between
2.0 and 3.9 basis points), indicating that recommendation levels have explanatory value for future
returns, even conditional on price and earnings momentum.
We turn next to an examination of whether ratings changes have predictive value for security re-
turns incremental to ratings levels. We do so by computing average abnormal returns to upgrades,
downgrades, and initiations/reiterations, conditional on ratings level. For each ratings level, up-
grades are associated with the largest average abnormal return and downgrades, the smallest,
consistent with ratings changes providing incremental predictive value for security returns over
ratings levels. With respect to buy ratings, for example, upgrades generate average daily abnormal
returns that are 2.7 basis points greater than that of downgrades, with the difference being reliably
positive. Upgrades to hold outperform downgrades to hold by a significant 1.4 basis points.
We then examine whether ratings levels have predictive value for security returns incremental
to ratings changes. We do so by conditioning on the sign and magnitude of a ratings change and
comparing average abnormal returns across recommendation levels. If levels do have incremental
2 These results are consistent with findings reported in Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996).
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predictive value, we would expect stocks with more favorable ratings to have higher average
abnormal returns than stocks with less favorable ratings.
Conditioning first on upgrades of one ratings level (sometimes referred to below as single
upgrades), we find that stocks rated buy or strong buy generate a significant average abnormal
return of 2 basis points per day, while stocks rated hold or sell generate an insignificant 0.1 basis
point average daily abnormal return. The difference of 1.8 basis points is reliably positive.3 For
upgrades of two ratings levels (alternatively referred to as double upgrades), we find that stocks
rated buy or strong buy are associated with a significant daily average abnormal return of 2.3
basis points; the corresponding return for stocks rated hold is an insignificant 0.5 basis points.
Again, the difference between these two returns is reliably positive.
Conditioning on downgrades of one ratings level (sometimes referred to as single downgrades),
the stocks rated sell or strong sell generate a significantly negative average daily abnormal return
of −3.4 basis points, while those rated buy are associated with an insignificant average daily
abnormal return of −0.5 basis points. The difference of −2.9 basis points is quite large and reliably
negative. For downgrades of two ratings levels (alternatively referred to as double downgrades),
stocks rated sell or strong sell generate a significant average daily abnormal return of −2.9
basis points; for stocks rated hold, the corresponding return is −1.4 basis points. The difference
is reliably negative. Overall, these results strongly suggest that ratings levels have incremental
predictive value for security returns over ratings changes.4
Consistent with our return results, we find that both ratings levels and ratings changes predict the
magnitude of, as well as the price reaction to, future unexpected earnings. This is not surprising,
given that earnings are a principal driver of stock prices; the ability to predict security returns also
should be reflected in an ability to forecast unexpected earnings. Our test consists of regressing
unexpected earnings, and separately the price reaction to unexpected earnings, on ratings levels,
ratings changes, and several control variables. Both levels and changes enter significantly into
the two regressions.
Our results yield a number of important insights. First, they suggest the potential for investors
to enhance expected returns by conditioning their investment strategies on both recommendation
levels and changes, rather than on just one or the other. This potential for improved returns is
illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the cumulative daily raw returns to 1) a levels-only hedge
strategy of purchasing all stocks rated buy or strong buy and selling short all stocks rated sell
or strong sell, 2) a changes-only hedge strategy of purchasing all upgraded stocks and shorting
all downgraded ones, and 3) a levels- and changes-based hedge strategy of purchasing all stocks
receiving a double upgrade to buy or strong buy and shorting all those receiving a double
downgrade to sell or strong sell. A $1 investment in either a levels-only or a changes-only
strategy at the beginning of 1986 would have grown to slightly over $7 at the end of 2006. In
contrast, that same $1 invested in a combined levels- and changes-based strategy would have
grown to over $24.5
Second, our results provide insights into the nature of two possible mechanisms by which
ratings levels and changes predict future returns. One mechanism is for recommendations to
3 The differences we report occasionally deviate slightly from the differences in individual returns due to rounding.
4 In line with these results, Barber et al. (2001) and Boni and Womack (2006) find that the three-day return around
recommendation announcement dates varies with ratings level, conditional on ratings change. (The statistical significance
of these findings, however, is not reported.)
5 In untabulated results, we find that this combined strategy earns more than either the levels-based or changes-based
strategy in 18 of the 21 years of our sample period. Our return results abstract from transactions costs (brokerage
commissions, the bid-ask spread, and the possible impact of trades on market prices).
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Figure 1. Value of $1 Invested in Recommendation-Based Strategies, January
1986 through December 2006
Plotted here are the cumulative raw returns to 1) a levels-only hedge strategy of purchasing all stocks rated
buy or strong buy, and selling short all stocks rated sell or strong sell; 2) a changes-only hedge strategy of
purchasing all upgraded stocks and shorting all downgraded ones; and 3) a levels- and changes-based hedge
strategy of purchasing all stocks receiving a double upgrade to buy or strong buy and shorting all those
































































































Levels- and Changes-Based Portfolio:
Long: All Buy/Strong Buy
Short: All Sell/Strong Sell
Changes-Based Portfolio:
Long: All Upgrades
Short: All Downgrades 
Short: Double Downgrades to Sell/Strong Sell
Long: Double Upgrades to Buy/Strong Buy
Levels-Based Portfolio:
permanently shift the demand for stocks, even if the recommendations are uninformative. The
other is for recommendations to convey analysts’ valuable private information about the future
financial success of the firms they cover (or, equivalently, their superior interpretation of relevant
public information). In the latter case, recommendations should be predictive of future unexpected
earnings. Moreover, to the extent that prices do not fully and instantaneously adjust to the
information content of the recommendations, they should also be able to predict the price reactions
to unexpected earnings. Our findings that recommendations (both levels and changes) do have
the ability to forecast future unexpected earnings as well as the associated price reaction provide
strong evidence that the predictive power of analysts’ recommendations does not stem solely from
their ability to shift investor demand. Rather, it reflects, at least in part, their ability to gather
relevant private financial information.6
A third insight of our analysis relates to the consistency between analysts’ recommendations
and the formal ratings definitions issued by securities firms. These definitions are quite uniform
across firms. At its core, a buy or strong buy means that an analyst expects the stock price to
increase (sometimes by a certain minimum amount), either on an absolute or relative basis over
a specified time (usually the next 12 to 18 months); a sell or strong sell means that the expected
6 A similar conclusion is reached by Loh and Mian (2006).
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stock return is negative; and a hold means that the expected return is close to zero.7 These
definitions are independent of the prior recommendation level (if any), implying that realized
recommendation returns should be independent of whether a recommendation is an upgrade,
downgrade, reiteration, or initiation. That this is contradicted by our results strongly suggests that
analysts do not strictly abide by the formal ratings definitions when issuing recommendations.
This observation contributes to the debate over whether analysts’ alleged conflicts of interests (as
outlined in complaints leading up to the 2003 Global Research Analyst Settlement) have led to a
divergence between analysts’ stock ratings and their true investment opinions.8
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section I we describe our sample and research design. This
is followed in Section II by an examination of the unconditional abnormal returns to strategies
based on ratings levels and ratings changes. In Section III we investigate the extent to which
these abnormal returns are robust to controls for price and earnings momentum. The incremental
predictive value of ratings changes and ratings levels is examined in Sections IV and V. Section VI
contains a summary and conclusions.
I. Sample Selection, Descriptive Statistics, and Research Design
Our initial sample consists of all recommendations on the Zacks database from January 1986
through December 1995 and all real-time recommendations on the First Call database from
January 1996 through the end of 2006.9 From this sample, we drop all recommendations on
Zacks with a start date prior to January 1, 1986, and all recommendations on First Call with a
start date prior to January 1, 1996.
Both databases code recommendations using a five-point scale, ranging from 1 for strong
buy to 5 for strong sell. While the databases employ a five-point scale, some brokers choose to
issue only three different ratings—the equivalent of buy, hold, and sell—while still others switch
between a five-point and a three-point scale during our sample period.10 The recommendations
of the brokers who use a three-point scale are sometimes coded in these databases as 1, 3, and 5;
in other cases, they are coded as 2, 3, and 4. For uniformity we recode all such recommendations
as 1, 3, and 5.
7 For example, WR Hambrecht defines a buy as a stock that is “expected in absolute dollar terms to appreciate at least
10% over the next 6 months,” a hold as a stock that is “expected to appreciate or depreciate in absolute dollar terms less
than 10% over the next 6 months,” and a sell as a stock that is “expected to depreciate in absolute dollar terms at least
10% over the next 6 months.”
8 In its complaint against Salomon Smith Barney (SSB), for example, the SEC said that an e-mail written by a director
who provided research management support “suggested that the common terms SSB used to rate stocks did not mean
what they said: ‘various people in research and media relations are very easy targets for irate phone calls from clients,
reporters, etc. who make a very literal reading of the rating. . . . [I]f someone wants to read the rating system for exactly
what it says they have a perfect right to do that.’” See Boni and Womack (2002) for an extensive discussion of analysts’
alleged conflicts of interests.
9 Comparing the IBES recommendation databases of 2002 and 2004, Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) document
a large number of ex post changes to the recommendation records for the 1993-2002 period. They posit that these changes
influenced some of the conclusions reached by academics using the data. In light of their findings, we conducted a similar
analysis on the First Call database. We find very high consistency between the historical recommendations of databases
produced in different years, strongly suggesting that First Call does not suffer from the same problem that Ljungqvist,
Malloy, and Marston find in IBES.
10 Motivated by the implementation of NASD Rule 2711 in September 2002, many brokers switched from five-point to
three-point scales. The rule requires, in part, that each analyst research report disclose the percentage of its outstanding
recommendations that fall into each of three categories—buys, holds, and sells—regardless of whether the broker
internally uses more than three possible ratings to characterize its recommendations. For an in-depth discussion and
analysis of the switch in ratings scales, see Kadan et al. (2009).
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Table I. Transition Matrix of Analyst Recommendations, 1986-2006
This table shows the number of recommendations in our sample, partitioned according to prior and current
recommendation levels. The number of initiations in the database (first-time recommendations as well
as recommendations for firms that were previously dropped from coverage) is also presented. Below the
number of recommendations for each partition is the percentage that those recommendations make up of the
total. Fractional recommendations are rounded to the nearest whole value. Data for 1986-1995 come from
the Zacks database; for 1996-2006, the First Call database is the source for recommendations.
To Recommendation of
Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell Total
From recommendation of
Strong buy 78,655 45,348 59,388 1,564 2,985 187,940
% of total 7.8 4.5 5.9 0.2 0.3
Buy 43,335 50,971 54,241 3,686 1,969 154,202
% of total 4.3 5.1 5.4 0.4 0.2
Hold 47,954 43,616 91,792 14,653 16,480 214,495
% of total 4.8 4.4 9.2 1.5 1.6
Sell 1,276 3,081 13,941 5,939 4,375 28,612
% of total 0.1 0.3 1.4 0.6 0.4
Strong sell 2,103 1,569 15,423 4,080 8,417 31,592
% of total 0.2 0.2 1.5 0.4 0.8
Initiations 127,328 93,516 131,811 13,653 19,469 385,777
% of total 12.7 9.3 13.2 1.4 1.9
Total 300,651 238,101 366,596 43,575 53,695 1,002,618
Table I presents the number of recommendations in our sample, partitioned according to the
prior recommendation (if any) issued by the brokerage firm and the current recommendation.
Of the more than 1,000,000 recommendations in our sample, only 9.8%, or about 97,000, are
movements to, or initiations of, either sell or strong sell. The dearth of such recommendations
has been well documented in the literature and is consistent with analysts’ alleged reluctance to
issue negative recommendations on the firms they follow.11 In contrast, revisions to, or initia-
tions of, buy or strong buy total over 538,000, or 53.8% of the total number of recommendation
announcements. Upgrades and downgrades make up 17.6% and 20.4%, respectively, of the sam-
ple; reiterations of recommendations comprise 23.5%; and initiations account for the remaining
38.5% of the total.
Our principal analyses require the calculation of abnormal returns for portfolios of recommen-
dations, partitioned according to ratings level and/or ratings change. To understand how these
returns are calculated, take as an example a portfolio consisting of all stocks rated strong buy.
Each such stock enters the portfolio at the close of trading on the day that the strong buy is
issued (unless the announcement comes after the market close, in which case the stock enters the
portfolio at the close of the following trading day).12 The stock remains in the portfolio through
11 Barber et al. (2006) document the historical pattern in the percentages of buys, holds, and sells for the 1996-June 2003
time period.
12 By establishing positions at the close of trading, we explicitly exclude the first trading day recommendation returns.
We do so to reflect that many investors, especially small ones, likely learn of recommendations only with a delay. Green
(2006) estimates that buying (selling) shares at the beginning of the trading day subsequent to the announcement of
an upgrade (downgrade), rather than waiting until the end of the day, would increase returns by approximately 1.5 (2)
percentage points.
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the close of trading on the day that the brokerage firm removes the strong buy rating (unless
the recommendation removal is announced after trading hours, in which case the stock drops out
of the portfolio at the close on the next trading day).13 If more than one brokerage firm has an
outstanding strong buy recommendation for a particular stock on a given date, then that stock
will appear multiple times in the portfolio on that date, once for each such recommendation. Each
portfolio is rebalanced daily.14









where Rit is the raw return on date t for recommendation i, nt is the number of recommendations
in the portfolio on that date, and xit is the compounded daily return of recommendation i from the
close of trading on the day it is issued through day t−1. (The variable xit equals one for a stock
recommended as strong buy on day t−1.) This calculation yields a time series of approximately
5,000 daily portfolio returns.
Abnormal returns are calculated as the intercept, αj, from the four-factor model of Carhart
(1997), found by estimating the following daily time-series regression for each portfolio j:
R jt − R f t = α j + β j (Rmt − R f t ) + s j SMBt + h j HMLt + u j UMDt + ε j t , (2)
where R jt is the date t return on portfolio j, R f t is the date t risk-free rate, Rmt is the date
t return on the value-weighted market index, SMBt is the date t return on a value-weighted
portfolio of small-cap stocks minus the date t return on a value-weighted portfolio of large-cap
stocks, HMLt is the date t return on a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks
minus the date t return on a value-weighted portfolio of low book-to-market stocks, and UMDt
is the date t return on a value-weighted portfolio of stocks recently up minus the date t return
on a value-weighted portfolio of stocks recently down.15 (Results are qualitatively similar when
market-adjusted returns are used in place of four-factor model abnormal returns.) The regression
yields parameter estimates of αj, β j, sj, hj, and uj. The regression error term is denoted by εj.
II. Unconditional Abnormal Returns to Ratings Levels
and Ratings Changes
We begin this section by calculating abnormal returns for portfolios of recommendations
partitioned solely by ratings level, independent of ratings change (if any). Consistent with results
13 In the First Call database, we can distinguish between recommendations made before and after the close because date
and time stamps are provided for each recommendation. We cannot do so for recommendations in the Zacks database
because only date stamps are given.
14 For those Zacks recommendations that remain in force past December 31, 1995 (when we switch to the use of the
First Call database), we extend the return calculations through the recommendations’ end-dates on Zacks, rather than
arbitrarily cut them off on December 31. Further, any recommendation outstanding for more than one year is dropped at
the end of the year, under the assumption that the recommendation has become stale by that time.
15 See Ken French’s online data library for factor data and a description of their calculation.
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in Barber et al. (2001), average daily abnormal returns generally decrease as we move from more
favorable to less favorable recommendation levels.16 As presented in Table II, Panel A, strong
buys and buys are associated with significant average daily abnormal returns of 1.0 and 0.7
basis points, respectively. The corresponding returns for sells and strong sells are a significant
−2.5 and −2.4 basis points, respectively. The difference between the strong buy and strong sell
recommendation returns, 3.4 basis points, is economically large and reliably positive. The average
daily abnormal return for holds is not reliably different from zero.
We next calculate abnormal returns for portfolios of recommendations partitioned solely by
ratings change, independent of ratings level. Table II, Panel B, presents the results. As expected,
upgrades generate the largest average daily abnormal return, 1.9 basis points. Downgrades earn the
lowest, −1.0 basis points. The difference between these returns, 2.9 basis points, is economically
large and significantly greater than zero. Reiterations and initiations generate an insignificant 0.5
basis point average daily abnormal return.
Even though upgrades, overall, earn the highest returns, there is no significant association
between the magnitude of an upgrade and abnormal returns. As reported in Table II, Panel C,
while single and double upgrades are associated with average daily abnormal returns of 1.8 and
2.2 basis points, respectively, the difference is not reliably negative. Moreover, upgrades of three
ratings levels earn an average abnormal return that is neither significantly different from zero nor
reliably different from the average abnormal returns to single and double upgrades.
In contrast, a significant relation exists between the magnitude of a downgrade and abnormal
returns (Panel D). Single downgrades generate a significant average daily abnormal return of
−0.7 basis points, while double downgrades are associated with a significant average daily
abnormal return of −1.6 basis points. The difference, −0.9 basis points, is reliably negative.
Triple downgrades yield the most negative average daily abnormal return, −4.4 basis points.
This is 2.8 basis points more negative than that of double downgrades and 3.7 basis points
more negative than single downgrades. Both of these differences are economically large and
significantly negative.
III. Controlling for Price and Earnings Momentum
Jegadeesh et al. (2004) report that the significant relation between ratings level and abnormal
return disappears after controlling for price and earnings momentum. In this section we replicate
the calculation of their momentum index while employing our portfolio formation methodology
(which ensures no delay in the accumulation of recommendation returns) to test whether ratings
levels and ratings changes continue to provide significant explanatory power for abnormal returns.
At the time a recommendation is issued, a momentum index score ranging between 0 and 4 is
compiled. Four variables comprise the index. The first is the price momentum over the period
from 252 to 127 trading days (approximately 12 to 6 months) prior to the recommendation date.





(1 + rit ) −
−127∏
t=−252
(1 + rmt ), (3)
16 See also Cliff (2007) for an analysis of abnormal returns to portfolios formed solely on the basis of recommendation
levels.
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Table II. Unconditional Average Daily Abnormal Returns to Ratings Levels and
Ratings Changes
This table reports the average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (in basis points), and corre-
sponding t-statistics, for recommendations partitioned according to ratings level (Panel A), ratings change
(Panel B), magnitude of recommendation upgrade (Panel C), and magnitude of recommendation downgrade
(Panel D). The difference in returns between various pairs of partitions is also presented. The average daily
abnormal return is the intercept from a regression of the daily portfolio excess return on 1) the excess of the
market return over the risk-free rate, 2) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio
of small stocks and one of large stocks, 3) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted port-
folio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, and 4) the difference between
the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of stocks recently up and one of stocks recently down.
Panel A. Unconditional Returns to Ratings Levels
Ratings Level Average Daily Abnormal Return (bps) t-Statistic




Strong sell −2.4∗∗∗ −3.92
Strong buy–strong sell 3.4∗∗∗ 5.73
Strong buy–hold 1.3∗∗∗ 5.24
Strong sell–hold −2.1∗∗∗ 3.90
Panel B. Unconditional Returns to Ratings Changes
Ratings Change Average Daily Abnormal Return (bps) t-Statistic
All upgrades 1.9∗∗∗ 6.95
All reit/init 0.5∗ 1.90




Panel C. Unconditional Returns across Upgrade Magnitudes
Magnitude of Upgrade Average Daily Abnormal Return (bps) t-Statistic
All single upgrades 1.8∗∗∗ 6.14
All double upgrades 2.2∗∗∗ 6.79




Panel D. Unconditional Returns across Downgrade Magnitudes
Magnitude of Downgrade Average Daily Abnormal Return (bps) t-Statistic
All single downgrades −0.7∗∗ −2.30
All double downgrades −1.6∗∗∗ −4.74




∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗Significant at the 0.05 level.
∗Significant at the 0.10 level.
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where rit is the raw return for stock i on day t relative to the recommendation announcement date,
and rmt is the value-weighted market return for that trading day. The second variable is the price
momentum over the period from 126 to 1 trading day prior to the recommendation date. Denoted




(1 + rit ) −
−1∏
t=−126
(1 + rmt ). (4)
The third measure is the sum of the six most recent consensus analyst earnings forecast re-
visions for stock i (as reported monthly in the IBES summary forecast database) prior to the








where AFim is the mth most recent consensus analyst forecast of stock i’s current year’s earnings,
and Pim is the price of the stock at the time that the consensus is calculated.19 The final component
of the index measures earnings momentum and is defined as the unexpected earnings for the
most recent fiscal quarter q prior to the recommendation announcement date, normalized by the
standard deviation of the earnings forecasts. Denoted by SUEiq, it is given by
SUEiq = EPSiq − AFiq
std(AFiq )
, (6)
where EPSiq is the realized earnings per share of stock i for quarter q (as reported in the IBES
database), AFiq is the most recent consensus analyst quarterly earnings forecast prior to the
end of quarter q, and std(AFiq) is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the analyst forecasts
comprising the consensus.20
For each of the four measures, we assign a score of one (zero) if its magnitude is above
(below) the median for all firms as of the recommendation date. The momentum index (MI) for
recommendation i is the sum of these four scores and ranges between 0 and 4.
For all recommendations with the same MI score, we construct a portfolio of buy- and strong-
buy-rated stocks and another of those rated sell or strong sell. Separately, we form a portfolio
of stocks receiving upgrades and another of those receiving downgrades. For each of these four
portfolios, we calculate average daily abnormal returns.
Return results for the buy/strong buy and sell/strong sell portfolios are reported in Table III,
panel A. For each MI score, the stocks rated buy or strong buy significantly outperform those
17 While Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) find evidence of ex post changes in the IBES recommendation database,
they do not find similar irregularities in the database of IBES earnings forecasts.
18 For some firms, consensus analyst forecasts are not available on IBES for every month of the prior half year. For those
firms, we use all of the consensus analyst forecasts available during that period.
19 If the recommendation is made after the end of the year, but before the year’s earnings are announced, then the earnings
forecasts are for the year just ended.
20 The individual analysts’ forecasts that are used to calculate std(AFiq) come from IBES. The variable std(AFiq) is set to
0.01 if either there are fewer than two analyst forecasts outstanding or the standard deviation of the analyst forecasts is
equal to zero. This definition of unexpected earnings is used by Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006).
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Table III. Average Daily Abnormal Returns to Ratings Levels and Ratings
Changes, Conditional on Momentum Index Score
This table reports the average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (in basis points), and below
them the corresponding t-statistics, for portfolios of recommendations having the same Momentum Index
(MI) score. The four portfolios are 1) that composed of all buy and strong buy recommendations, 2) that
containing all sell and strong sell recommendations, 3) that composed of all upgrades, and 4) that containing
all downgrades. Also presented is the difference between the average daily abnormal returns of the buy/strong
buy portfolio and the sell/strong sell portfolio as well as the difference between the average daily abnormal
returns of the upgrade and downgrade portfolios. To determine the MI score for each recommendation,
we calculate four measures: 1) the cumulative market-adjusted return for the recommended stock over the
period from 252 to 127 days prior to the recommendation announcement, 2) the cumulative market-adjusted
return for the recommended stock over the period from 126 days to 1 day prior to the announcement, 3)
the sum of the six most recent monthly consensus analyst forecast revisions prior to the recommendation
announcement, normalized by price, and 4) the difference between realized earnings and the consensus
analyst forecast for the most recent quarter prior to the recommendation announcement, scaled by the
standard deviation of the forecasts comprising the consensus. For each measure we assign a score of 1
(0) if its value is above (below) the median for all firms as of the recommendation date. The MI score is
the sum of these four individual scores and ranges from 0 to 4. The average daily abnormal return is the
intercept from a regression of the daily portfolio excess return on 1) the excess of the market return over
the risk-free rate, 2) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks
and one of large stocks, 3) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high
book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, and 4) the difference between the daily returns
of a value-weighted portfolio of stocks recently up and one of stocks recently down.
Panel A. Returns to Ratings Levels, Conditional on Momentum Index Score
Momentum Buy/ Sell/ Buy/Strong Buy –
Index Score Strong Buy Strong Sell Sell/Strong Sell
0 (Lowest) 0.8 −3.1∗∗∗ 3.9∗∗∗
(1.57) (−2.59) (3.42)
1 1.0∗∗∗ −1.9∗∗∗ 2.9∗∗∗
(2.78) (−2.59) (4.24)
2 1.0∗∗∗ −1.4∗ 2.4∗∗∗
(3.46) (−1.68) (2.96)
3 1.5∗∗∗ −0.5 2.0∗∗∗
(4.66) (−0.71) (2.84)
4 (Highest) 1.5∗∗∗ −1.4 2.9∗∗∗
(3.38) (−1.46) (3.07)
Panel B. Returns to Ratings Changes, Conditional on Momentum Index Score
Momentum Upgrades–
Index Score Upgrades Downgrades Downgrades
0 (Lowest) 1.5∗∗ −1.4∗∗ 3.0∗∗∗
(2.57) (−2.23) (5.09)
1 2.1∗∗∗ −0.7 2.7∗∗∗
(4.64) (−1.49) (7.16)
2 2.2∗∗∗ −0.6 2.7∗∗∗
(5.97) (−1.54) (7.64)
3 2.3∗∗∗ 0.1 2.1∗∗∗
(5.85) (0.28) (6.03)
4 (Highest) 2.5∗∗∗ −0.5 3.0∗∗∗
(4.82) (−1.20) (7.44)
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗Significant at the 0.05 level.
∗Significant at the 0.10 level.
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rated sell or strong sell. The average daily abnormal return difference ranges from 2.0 basis
points (for an MI score of 3) to an economically very large 3.9 basis points (for an MI score of 0).
Conditioning on price and earnings momentum, ratings levels continue to have predictive value
for security returns.
The upgrade and downgrade portfolio return results appear in Panel B. For each MI score,
upgrades significantly outperform downgrades. The difference in average daily abnormal returns
ranges from 2.1 basis points (for an MI score of 3) to 3.0 basis points (for MI scores of 0 and
4). As with ratings levels, ratings changes also provide predictive power for security returns,
conditional on price and earnings momentum.
IV. The Incremental Predictive Value of Ratings Changes
and Levels
A. Ratings Changes
In this subsection we test whether ratings changes have predictive value for security returns
incremental to that of ratings levels. If they do, then for a fixed ratings level, abnormal returns
should vary across ratings changes, with upgrades generating the highest returns and downgrades
the lowest. Note that our unconditional return results are insufficient to address this issue since
the higher average return to upgrades could, in principle, be due to their predominantly being
buy and strong buy recommendations, while the lower return to downgrades could be due to their
predominantly being holds, sells, and strong sells.
As presented in Table IV, upgrades do indeed generate the highest returns and downgrades the
lowest, conditional on recommendation level, consistent with ratings changes providing incre-
mental predictive value for security returns. Within the subset of strong buy recommendations,
upgrades are associated with an average daily abnormal return of 2.0 basis points, significantly
greater than the 0.7 basis point average daily abnormal return for reiterations and initiations. For
buy recommendations, upgrades earn an average daily abnormal return of 2.2 basis points, while
downgrades generate abnormal returns that are insignificantly different from zero. The difference
in returns is reliably positive. With respect to hold recommendations, downgrades earn a reliably
negative average abnormal return of −1.0 basis points; the corresponding return for upgrades is
insignificantly different from zero. The difference in returns is reliably negative. Within the subset
of sell recommendations, downgrades are associated with a significant −3.6 basis point average
daily abnormal return. Upgrades, in contrast, do not generate a return significantly different from
zero. Despite this, upgrade and downgrade returns are not reliably different from each other. This
is likely due, at least in part, to the small number of upgrades to sell in our sample. (They comprise
less than 0.4% of the total.) The average abnormal return to downgrades, though, is significantly
more negative than that for reiterations and initiations (at −1.6 basis points). Overall, our results
provide strong evidence that ratings changes have incremental predictive value for security returns
over ratings levels.
B. Ratings Levels
We next test whether ratings levels have predictive value for security returns incremental
to ratings changes. We do so by holding fixed the sign and magnitude of the ratings change
and examining whether abnormal returns vary with ratings level. If ratings levels do provide
incremental predictive value over changes, then upgrades to buy and strong buy should outperform
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Table IV. Average Daily Abnormal Return to Ratings Changes, Conditional
on Ratings Level
This table reports the average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (in basis points), and below
them the corresponding t-statistics, for recommendations partitioned according to ratings change, conditional
on ratings level. The difference in returns between various pairs of partitions is also presented. The average
daily abnormal return is the intercept from a regression of the daily portfolio excess return on 1) the
excess of the market return over the risk-free rate, 2) the difference between the daily returns of a value-
weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks, 3) the difference between the daily returns of a
value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks, and 4) the
difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of stocks recently up and one of stocks
recently down.
Ratings Change Ratings Level
Strong Buy Buy Hold Sell Strong Sell
Upgrades 2.0∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗∗ 0.5 −1.0 –
(6.73) (6.85) (1.02) (−0.26) –
Reit/init 0.7∗∗ 0.7∗∗∗ 0.0 −1.6∗∗∗ −2.3∗∗∗
(2.46) (2.65) (−0.09) (−2.84) (−3.35)
Downgrades – −0.5 −1.0∗∗∗ −3.6∗∗∗ −2.7∗∗∗
– (−1.44) (−3.04) (−6.32) (−3.31)
Upgrades–downgrades – 2.7∗∗∗ 1.4∗∗∗ 2.6 –
– (8.39) (3.54) (0.68) –
Upgrades–reit/init 1.3∗∗∗ 1.5∗∗∗ 0.5 0.6 –
(6.10) (5.61) (1.30) (0.16) –
Downgrades–reit/init – −1.1∗∗∗ −1.0∗∗∗ −2.0∗∗∗ −0.4
– (−4.38) (−4.39) (−3.05) (−0.44)
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗Significant at the 0.05 level.
upgrades to hold and sell. Also, downgrades to buy should outperform downgrades to hold, sell,
and strong sell. Note again that our unconditional return results cannot be used to address this
issue as it is possible that the higher average returns to buys and strong buys are due to these
recommendations predominantly being upgrades, while the lower average returns to holds, sells,
and strong sells are due to these recommendations predominantly being downgrades.
Our test results are presented in Table V. Turning first to the subset of single upgrade rec-
ommendations (Panel A), the average daily abnormal return for buys and strong buys is a
significant 2.0 basis points. In contrast, holds and sells generate an insignificant average daily ab-
normal return. The difference between the abnormal returns, 1.8 basis points, is reliably greater
than zero. Within the subset of single downgrades (Panel B), hold, sell, and strong sell rec-
ommendations generate a significant average daily abnormal return of −0.9 basis points. For
the single downgrades to sell and strong sell, the average daily abnormal return is −3.4 basis
points. In contrast, the corresponding return for downgrades to buy is insignificantly differ-
ent from zero. The difference of −2.9 basis points is quite large and significantly less than
zero.
Turning next to the subset of double upgrades (Panel C), the average daily abnormal return
for buys and strong buys is a significant 2.3 basis points. In contrast, holds earn an insignificant
abnormal return. The difference, 1.9 basis points, is reliably greater than zero. For the subset
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Table V. Average Daily Abnormal Return to Ratings Levels, Conditional
on Ratings Change
This table reports the average daily percentage buy-and-hold abnormal returns (in basis points) and the
corresponding t-statistics for recommendations partitioned according to ratings level, conditional on a
single upgrade or single downgrade (Panels A and B, respectively), and conditional on a double upgrade or
double downgrade (Panels C and D, respectively). The average daily abnormal return is the intercept from a
regression of the daily portfolio excess return on 1) the excess of the market return over the risk-free rate, 2)
the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks,
3) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and
one of low book-to-market stocks, and 4) the difference between the daily returns of a value-weighted
portfolio of stocks recently up and one of stocks recently down.
Average Daily Abnormal Return (bps) t-Statistic
Panel A. Single Upgrades to
Buy/strong buy 2.0∗∗∗ 6.66
Hold/sell 0.1 0.26
Buy/strong buy–hold/sell 1.8∗∗∗ 3.67
Panel B. Single Downgrades to
Hold/sell/strong sell −0.9∗∗ −2.56
Buy −0.5 −1.45
Hold/sell/strong sell–buy −0.4 −1.31
Sell/strong sell −3.4∗∗∗ −6.53
Buy −0.5 −1.45
Sell/strong sell–buy −2.9∗∗∗ −5.72
Panel C. Double Upgrades to
Buy/strong buy 2.3∗∗∗ 6.95
Hold 0.5 0.70
Buy/strong buy–hold 1.9∗∗∗ 2.95
Panel D. Double Downgrades to
Sell/strong sell −2.9∗∗∗ −4.06
Hold −1.4∗∗∗ −4.15
Sell/strong sell–hold −1.4∗∗ −2.1
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗Significant at the 0.05 level.
of double downgrades (Panel D), sell and strong sell recommendations are associated with a
significant average daily abnormal return of −2.9 basis points. The corresponding return for
hold recommendations is only −1.4 basis points. The difference of −1.4 basis points is reliably
negative. Overall, these results provide strong evidence that ratings levels have incremental
predictive value for security returns over ratings changes.21
21 We perform similar analyses for the subsets of all upgrades and all downgrades (regardless of magnitude). Untabulated
results reveal that the average daily abnormal return to upgrades to buy or strong buy is significantly greater than the
corresponding return to upgrades to hold or sell. Similarly, the average daily abnormal return to downgrades to hold, sell,
or strong sell is significantly less than the corresponding return to downgrades to buy.
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C. Levels- and Changes-Based Trading Strategies
The abnormal return findings presented in the prior two subsections suggest that investment
strategies involving both recommendation levels and changes can outperform those based on either
levels or changes alone. We document the return differences among various hedge strategies in
Columns 1 and 2 of Table VI. As reported in Panel A, a combined levels- and changes-based hedge
strategy of purchasing stocks receiving single upgrades to buy or strong buy and shorting those
receiving single downgrades to sell or strong sell generates a significant average daily abnormal
return of 5.5 basis points.22 In contrast, a changes-only based hedge strategy of purchasing all
single upgrades and shorting all single downgrades earns an average daily abnormal return of
2.5 basis points. The difference between these returns (3.0 basis points, or over 7% annually)
is economically large and significantly greater than zero. A levels-only based hedge strategy of
purchasing all buys and strong buys and shorting all sells and strong sells generates an average
daily abnormal return of 3.5 basis points. Again, this return is reliably less than that earned by
the combined strategy.
The same pattern is found for double upgrades. As reported in Panel B, a combined levels- and
changes-based strategy of purchasing stocks receiving double upgrades to buy or strong buy and
shorting stocks receiving double downgrades to sell or strong sell yields a significant average
daily abnormal return of 5.2 basis points. The corresponding return to a changes-only based
hedge strategy of purchasing all double upgrades and shorting all double downgrades is 3.8 basis
points. The difference between these two returns is reliably greater than zero. The combined
strategy’s average daily abnormal return is also reliably greater than that of the levels-only based
strategy of purchasing all stocks rated either buy or strong buy and shorting all those rated sell
or strong sell. These results clearly demonstrate the potential for enhancing investment returns
by conditioning on both recommendation levels and changes rather than on one to the exclusion
of the other.23
In Columns 3 through 6 of Table VI, we present the average abnormal returns to the long
and short components of each hedge strategy. As the results reveal, the superiority of combined
levels- and changes-based hedge strategies carries over in large measure to both their long and
short components.24 As shown in Panel A, a strategy of purchasing all single upgrades to buy
or strong buy generates significantly higher average abnormal returns than does either a strategy
of purchasing all single upgrades or one of purchasing all buys and strong buys. Similarly, a
22 This return deviates slightly from the difference between the returns to single upgrades to buy or strong buy (2.0 basis
points) and single downgrades to sell or strong sell (−3.4 basis points), as given in Table V. This small discrepancy is
due to rounding.
23 We alternatively calculate monthly, rather than daily, hedge strategy abnormal returns (by compounding daily returns
within each month and regressing the monthly returns on the monthly factor returns). In unreported results, we find
that the monthly abnormal returns are of the same order of magnitude as the corresponding daily returns (multiplied by
20), albeit slightly smaller in size. All combined levels- and changes-based hedge strategies continue to earn average
abnormal returns significantly higher than those generated by the corresponding levels-only and changes-only based
hedge strategies, with one exception—the average abnormal return to a strategy of purchasing double upgrades to buy or
strong buy and shorting double downgrades to sell or strong sell is not significantly different from that of a strategy of
purchasing all double upgrades and shorting all double downgrades.
24 In untabulated analysis, we generate descriptive statistics on the size composition of the firms in each of the long and
short portfolios. Of note, the portfolio of single downgrades to sell or strong sell is tilted more toward smaller stocks, while
the portfolio of double upgrades to buy or strong buy is tilted more toward larger stocks, relative to the corresponding
levels-only and changes-only based portfolios. Further, the mean and median market caps of the portfolio of double
downgrades to sell or strong sell are smaller than those of either the double downgrade or the sell and strong sell portfolio.
All these differences, though, pale in comparison to the tilt toward larger stocks evident in the upgrade portfolios, as well
as in the portfolio of buys and strong buys, relative to the downgrade portfolios and the portfolio of sells and strong sells.
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strategy of shorting all single downgrades to sell or strong sell significantly outperforms a strat-
egy of either shorting all single downgrades or shorting all sells and strong sells. As reflected in
Panel B, a portfolio of all double upgrades to buy or strong buy generates a significantly higher
average abnormal return than does one of all buys and strong buys. However, it is not significantly
different from the average abnormal return earned on a portfolio of all double upgrades. On the
short side, a strategy of selling all double downgrades to sell or strong sell significantly outper-
forms a strategy of shorting all double downgrades. However, the strategy’s average abnormal
return is insignificantly different from that generated by shorting all sells and strong sells.
We repeat our hedge strategy analysis separately for the small, medium-sized, and large firms in
our sample in order to determine whether the superiority of combined levels- and changes-based
hedge strategies is in evidence across firm size categories.25 In untabulated results, we find that
all of the combined strategies dominate within the small stock subsample. Combined strategies
involving single-level upgrades and downgrades also dominate within the medium-sized firm
subsample; those involving double level upgrades and downgrades, however, do not. There is no
evidence of superior performance for combined levels- and changes-based strategies within our
big firm subsample. That our findings are strongest for the small firms is not surprising and is
consistent with patterns documented in numerous other studies of trading strategies.
We also calculate abnormal returns separately for each year of our sample period to ascertain
whether the superiority of hedge strategies based on both levels and changes is pervasive over
time or is concentrated in just a few years. Untabulated results reveal that it is not isolated to a
few years. In 17 of the 21 years of our sample period, the average abnormal return to a hedge
strategy of purchasing single upgrades to buy or strong buy and shorting single downgrades to
sell or strong sell is greater than that of a hedge strategy of purchasing all single upgrades and
shorting all single downgrades. In 18 of the years, it is greater than the average abnormal return
earned by a hedge strategy of purchasing all buys and strong buys and selling all sells and strong
sells. The hedge strategy of purchasing double upgrades to buy or strong buy and shorting double
downgrades to sell or strong sell outperforms that of purchasing all double upgrades and shorting
all double downgrades in 15 of the 21 years. Also, in 15 of the years, it outperforms the hedge
strategy of purchasing all buys and strong buys and shorting all sells and short sells.
V. Additional Evidence for the Incremental Predictive Value
of Ratings Changes and Rating Levels
As long as the incremental predictive power of ratings levels and changes for future returns is at
least partly a result of analysts’ possession of private information about the future financial success
of the firms they cover (or, equivalently, a superior ability to interpret public financial disclosures),
then it should also manifest itself in the forecasting of unexpected earnings. Moreover, to the extent
that stock prices do not immediately adjust to the information content of the recommendations,
levels and changes should each have incremental predictive power for the price reactions to
unexpected earnings. We use these insights to design additional tests of incremental predictive
value. We implement them with respect to the first quarterly earnings announcement subsequent
to recommendation release.
We define unexpected earnings for firm i in quarter q as the difference between real-
ized earnings, EPSiq, and the consensus analyst earnings forecast just prior to the earnings
25 Using monthly NYSE decile cutoffs, we classify firms as big if they fall within the top three deciles, small if they fall
within the bottom three deciles, and medium-sized otherwise.
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announcement, AFiq, scaled by the per share price of the firm, Piq, at the end of the month
preceding the announcement. Denoted by UEiq, it is given by26
UEiq = EPSiq − AFiq
Piq
. (7)
The price reaction to the earnings announcement, RETiq, is defined as the market-adjusted return




(1 + rid ) −
+1∏
d=−1
(1 + rmd ), (8)
where rid is the raw return for stock i on day d, and rmd is the value-weighted market return on
that day. Date d = 0 is the earnings announcement day.
For each of these two measures, we run the following regression:
SURPiq = a0 + a1LEVELiq + a2CHANGEiq + a3UEiq−1
+ a4PMOMi−127,−2 + a5AFRi−6,−1 + a6ln(MV iq ),
(9)
where
SURPiq = alternately UEiq and RETiq, as given by Expressions (7) and (8), respectively;
LEVELiq = the consensus recommendation level two days before the quarter q earnings an-
nouncement for firm i;27
CHANGEiq = the change in the consensus recommendation level over the period beginning
62 days before firm i’s earnings announcement for quarter q and ending two days prior;
UEiq−1 = the unexpected earnings for firm i in quarter q−1 (as defined by (7));
PMOMi−127,−2 = the market-adjusted return for firm i beginning 127 days before the quarter
q earnings announcement and ending two days prior;28
AFRi−6,−1 = the sum of the six most recent consensus analyst forecast revisions, prior to the
quarter q earnings announcement, for firm i’s current year earnings, each scaled by beginning-
of-month price;29
ln(MViq) = the natural logarithm of the market value of firm i at the end of the month preceding
the quarter q earnings announcement.
The independent variables, UEiq−1, PMOMi−127,−2, and AFR
i
−6,−1, serve as controls for price
and earnings momentum. Their inclusion is motivated by the conclusion of Jegadeesh et al. (2004)
that, controlling for price and earnings momentum, ratings levels do not have predictive value for
security returns. The natural logarithm of market value, ln(MViq), is included in the regression as
a control for firm size.
Table VII, Column 1 presents regression results with unexpected earnings as the dependent
variable, while Column 2 reports results with the market-adjusted return serving as the dependent
variable. Both regressions are based on nearly 190,000 earnings announcements. The results are
26 We alternatively scale unexpected earnings by the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts. Untabulated regression
results are qualitatively similar to those reported here.
27 The consensus recommendation level is calculated as the average of the numerical ratings issued by all the analysts
who have outstanding recommendations on the stock.
28 The calculation of this variable is given by Expression (4), with Day 0 now defined as the earnings announcement date.
29 The calculation of this variable is given by Expression (5).
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Table VII. Regression Analysis of Future Earnings Surprises and Market
Reaction to Earnings Surprises on Prior Recommendation Levels and Changes
This table reports the intercept and coefficients from regressions with unexpected earnings for firm i in
the current quarter q (Column 1) and three-day market-adjusted return around the earnings announcement
(Column 2) as the dependent variable. The unexpected earnings for quarter q is defined as the difference
between the earnings for the quarter minus the consensus analyst forecast, scaled by share price at the
end of the month prior to the announcement. The three-day market-adjusted return is equal to the share’s
compounded raw return, from the day before until the day after the earnings announcement, minus the
corresponding compounded value-weighted market return. The current quarter q is defined as the quarter
whose earnings announcement is the first to follow the issuance of the recommendation. LEVELiq is
the consensus recommendation level for firm i two days prior to quarter q’s earnings announcement;
CHANGEiq is the change in the consensus recommendation level over the period beginning 62 days before
firm i’s earnings announcement for quarter q and ending two days prior to the announcement; UEiq−1
is the unexpected earnings for firm i in quarter q−1; PMOMi−127,−2 is the market-adjusted return for
firm i beginning 127 days before the quarter q earnings announcement and ending two days prior to the
announcement; AFRi−6,−1 is the sum of the revisions to the consensus analyst forecast for firm i’s current
year’s earnings during the six months prior to the quarter q earnings announcement date, scaled by beginning-
of-month price; and ln(MViq) is the natural logarithm of the market value of firm i at the end of the month
prior to the quarter q earnings announcement. The t-statistics appear below the intercept and coefficients.
Dependent Variable
Current Quarter’s 3-Day Market-Adjusted Return
















Number of observations 187,955 188,963
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
∗Significant at the 0.10 level.
very similar across the two regressions. The coefficients on both the consensus recommendation
level and the two-month change in the consensus recommendation are significantly different
from zero. Both coefficients are negative, as expected, implying that the less favorable (i.e., the
more positive) the consensus ratings level and the less favorable (again, the more positive) the
consensus ratings change, the smaller the unexpected earnings and the smaller the associated
price reaction. These results provide additional support for our conclusion that ratings levels and
ratings changes both have incremental predictive power for security returns.
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Our findings also yield insights into the mechanism(s) by which ratings levels and changes
predict future returns. One possible mechanism is for recommendations to increase the demand
for favorably rated stocks and reduce the demand for unfavorably rated ones, independent of
whether the recommendations are informative. Another possible (noncompeting) mechanism is
for recommendations to convey to investors analysts’ valuable private information about the future
financial success of the firms they cover. Our finding that recommendations have the ability to
forecast unexpected earnings and the associated price reaction provides strong evidence that the
predictive power of analysts’ recommendations does not stem solely from their ability to shift
investor demand. Rather, it reflects, at least in part, analysts’ skill at gathering relevant private
financial information.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
We provide evidence in this paper that the documented abnormal returns to analysts’ recom-
mendations are derived from both the ratings levels and the ratings changes. Conditional on
ratings level, upgrades earn the highest returns and downgrades the lowest. Conditional on the
sign and magnitude of a ratings change, the more favorable the recommendation level, the higher
the return.
These results imply that an investment strategy based on both recommendation levels and
recommendation changes has the potential to outperform one based exclusively on one or the
other. Conditioning just on recommendation levels, a strategy of purchasing all stocks rated buy
or strong buy and shorting all those rated sell or strong sell, for example, would have earned
an average daily abnormal return of 3.5 basis points during our sample period. Conditioning
just on recommendation changes, a strategy of purchasing all stocks receiving a double upgrade
and shorting all those receiving a double downgrade would have generated an average daily
abnormal return of 3.8 basis points. However, conditioning on both ratings changes and levels
by purchasing all stocks receiving a double upgrade to buy or strong buy and shorting all those
receiving a double downgrade to sell or strong sell would have yielded an average daily abnormal
return of 5.2 basis points. This is a greater than 4 percentage point improvement (on an annual
basis) over the levels-only based strategy and a 3.5% annual improvement over that based solely
on ratings changes.
We also find that ratings levels and changes have the ability to forecast future unexpected
earnings, as well as the corresponding market reactions. In addition to providing further evidence
that the abnormal returns to analysts’ security recommendations are attributable to both levels and
changes, this result implies that the predictive power of analysts’ recommendations is not simply
a product of analysts’ ability to shift investor demand; rather, it reflects their skill at collecting
valuable private information about the future financial success of the firms they cover.
As mentioned in the introduction, the formal ratings definitions promulgated by securities
firms are fairly uniform: they call for recommendations to be based on analysts’ expectation
for share performance over the recommendation horizon. These expectations are independent
of prior ratings level, implying that realized recommendation returns should be independent of
whether a rating is an upgrade, downgrade, reiteration, or initiation. That ratings changes do have
incremental predictive value for security returns suggests that analysts do not strictly follow the
published ratings definitions when issuing their recommendations. This conclusion adds to the
debate over whether analysts’ recommendations accurately reflect their investment opinions, an
issue that has been of central importance to the SEC in recent years. 
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